Monday 26 August 2013

Russia flexing military muscle along arc from Norway to Poland

Last week saw exercises carried out by elements of the Russian 200th Motorised Rifle Battalion near Pechenga, the site of a base which is located only 10 kilometres from the Norwegian border.[1] When the Zapad-13 exercises conclude next month, Russia's Armed Forces will have practised against every one of its potential neighbouring adversaries between the Barents Sea and the Ukraine. It would be helpful to briefly take stock of each of these. Beyond the recent exercises aimed at Norwegian positions, in March of this year, Russian manoeuvres near Lake Ladoga targeted Finnish territory. This was followed up in April with surprise exercises simulating air strikes against Sweden. The latter,it turned out, was completely defenceless, as it had been decided not to put any Gipen fighters on standby for quick reaction alert (QRA). Finally, the larger joint Russian-Belarussian Zapad-13 drills will take place near Poland and the Baltic states this September. Previous Zapad exercises have focused on precisely this region as an adversarial area. Latvia’s Defence Minister, Artis Pabriks, stated that he did not expect this year's drill to deviate from this established pattern. He also expressed concern over the changing military balance in the region in Russia's favour. The 2009 Zapad exercises became notorious for simulating tactical nuclear strikes against Poland, a non-nuclear power, which suggested a widened scope for the use of such weapons. On the NATO side, military drills, named Steadfast Jazz, will take place this November in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The Russian Deputy Defence Minister, Anatoly Antonov, has criticised the upcoming NATO exercise, Steadfast Jazz, which, in his words:

''envisages the application of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty triggering a response to an aggression against Poland. These drills are in the spirit of the Cold War,''

However, the reality is that the NATO exercise comes as a belated response to many years of Russian exercises, such as Zapad 09, targeting NATO's Eastern Flank.Steadfast Jazz is likely a response to the requests from the Baltic states for better defense planning in case of a Russian attack. It should be noted that, in the past, it has been difficult to reach agreement among all NATOs members in accepting such plans. From leaked diplomatic cables, its has become known that Eagle Guardian, a regional defence scheme from 2010, overcame strong resistance, particularly from Germany, and its adoption was contingent on its utmost secrecy. Fulfilling the basic defensive requirements set out by Baltic States and Poland seemed to threaten the very unity of the alliance.

It is important to note that the High North, or what used to be called the Northern Flank, is only in part a longer and increasingly militarised frontier which stretches through the Nordic states and abuts the Baltic region and Poland. This can be seen in the increasing intensity of Russian military exercises along NATO's borders which often encompass larger regions. Some parts of this year's Zapad 2013, for instance, will play out in the Barents Sea and the exercise therefore carries implications beyond Poland and the Baltic states. More generally, it would seem to this blogger that the dividing line between East and West is becoming more distinct and is assuming an increasingly military character. Unfortunately, this is a distinctly uneven process, whereby one side is, for the most part, cutting back on its defence expenditures, while the other is steadily increasing its readiness.




[1] In terms of supporting elements, particularly air defense and artillery units, the 200th Motorised Rifle Battlion is actually closer to a division in size. It is currently being re-equipped as one of two dedicated Arctic battalions.

Thursday 9 May 2013

POMOR 2013: For the cameras only

The annual POMOR exercises in which the navies of Norway and Russia participate are timed to coincide with 9th May celebrations in Russia and the allied victory over German forces in Europe more generally. The 2013 exercises commence this week. It is not the only military exercise to include Russian forces. The bi-annual Northern Eagle exercises which include Norwegian, Russian as well as US naval forces are also notable in this regard. It is mistakenly believed that these exercises represent a profound sense of military cooperation between states in the High North. This is quite simply not the case.

The exercises constitute mere exercises in gesture politics which convince few beyond academia and the general public. The POMOR exercises are simply an expanded PR stunt on part of the two sides to mark the defeat of Nazi regime in 1945. From leaked diplomatic cables it is clear that Norwegian officials would like to conduct goodwill military exercises more often in an attempt to broaden cooperation with the Russian Federation. However, these are often turned down by their Russian counterparts. In one such cable Deputy Director for Security Policy Jan Olsen at the Norwegian Ministry of Defence stated that
the GoN puts forward a work plan each year with Russia for military cooperation, and maybe half of what is proposed is actually accomplished. [1]
Rather than being genuine showcases of military cooperation,  special events marking the end of WWII have often revealed deeper underlying tensions between northern states. It is worth recalling the September 2010 incident which followed celebrations in Murmansk commemorating the wartime alliance between the US and the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany. On this occasion, the frigate USS Taylor was pursued closely in the Barents Sea by a Russian TU-95 bomber. The plane made a pass at a height of only 100 feet above the frigate with its bomb bay doors open. The following day, two Ka-27 anti-submarine helicopters buzzed the USS Taylor whilst it was still in the Russian part of the Barents Sea, coming as close as 30 yards to the vessel. This highly unusual and apparently aggressive manoeuvre was discussed by U.S Admiral Roughead and his Russian counterpart, Admiral Vysotsky. In April of last year, shortly before the start of the POMOR 2012 drills, a MiG-31 was involved in a near-miss with a Norwegian Orion aircraft after the Russian interceptor had come 'uncomfortably close' to the slow moving surveillance plane. Paradoxically, it seems such commemorative events are often useful opportunities for the Russian Federation to demonstrate its hostility towards its neighbours. 



[1] U.S. Embassy in Oslo, ‘EUR/RPM Director discusses NATO, Arctic and Afghanistan with Norwegian officials’, 26 January 2010 (Oslo 000045).

Monday 6 May 2013

Secretary General Rasmussen's Visit to Norway and NATO's role in the Arctic

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen is due to arrive in Northern Norway today along with other high ranking NATO officials such NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow. In connection with the visit there will be a debate at the University of Tromsø on NATO's role in the future hosted by the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Espen Barth Eide; a discussion which will presumably incorporate the question of its role in High North. Rasmussen will also inspect the Norwegian Joint Headquarters which are located about a kilometer inside a mountain complex at Reitan near Bodø. He will also receive a demonstration of the reaction times of Norwegian F-16s to airborne threats.

The visit could be interpreted as positive sign for Norway that its wishes for greater NATO attention towards the High North to counterbalance rising Russian power in the region are being listened to and that the alliance is become increasing aware of potential threats in their near abroad.. The Secretary General's tour of the High North comes after recent criticism of the combat readiness of Norwegian forces, particularly in the event of high-intensity conflicts, by former head of the Norwegian Defence Research Institute (FFI) Nils Holme. He characterised Norway's Armed Forces in the following way:
  1. Its air force has only 15 F-16s (of a total inventory of 50) available for missions at any given time.
  2. Its navy lacks the requisite manpower to give it vessels a full complement as well as the necessary maintenance crews.
  3. Its army  is only ready for action during certain times of the year and lacks the transport capacity to move to the most units to most vulnerable territories which are the coasts of Nord Troms and Finnmark. 
  4. Its Army reserve lacks funds to equip its soldiers properly or to train officers to lead them. 
Although it is difficult to gauge precisely the combat readiness of a military power without the necessary security clearance, such criticism will likely be examined closely owing to the impeccable credentials of the individual who has submitted them. If such assessments are indeed accurate, Norway may need its NATO allies in the High North more than ever.

Thursday 21 March 2013

25 February: An emblematic day for the High North

25 February 2013 saw a series of announcements which appear to underscore the inherent character of Arctic. Firstly, Norwegian Minister of Defence, Anne-Grete Strøm Erichsen, stated that Norway would welcome larger NATO exercises in the Arctic. This is in spite of the already substantial increases seen in recent years in the annual COLD RESPONSE exercises. The announcement seems to constitute a dog-whistle message with the United Kingdom as the primary intended recipient. At the time of the statement, UK Defence Secretary Philip Hammond was visiting Royal Marines engaged in military exercises in Northern Norway. Unlike many other NATO allies, the UK has a particular interest in Norway's security. The purpose of Hammond's trip to the Arctic was, according to media, 'to survey the Armed Forces’ role in protecting key energy supply routes across the Arctic' in a post-Afghanistan 'era of contingency'. The following week, a contingent of US special forces personnel conducted war games in the Finnish Arctic, in spite of the Nordic county's neutrality.

In an apparently unrelated move the same day, Russian President Vladimir Putin, pointed to several alarming developments for the region, including possible NATO expansion as well as plans for the European missile defence system. With this in mind, he stated that 'a danger of militarising the Arctic exists'. Although it does not break with Russia's assertive Arctic policy, pursued since 2007, this certainly marks a departure from the 'zone of peace' language that Putin has used in past years in which pessimistic forecasts from the region were categorically discounted. It serves to underline the meme of this blog that the High North is indeed an area of high tension.


Russian Ladoga 2013 Exercises: Target Finland

Russian military exercises in the Republic of Karelia near the Finnish border are due to start next week. Since the Georgia conflict in 2008, relations between Finland and Russia have deteriorated, particularly over the issue of possible Finnish membership of NATO. In the immediate aftermath of the South Ossetian War, Finnish defence officials noted Russia's use of camouflage patterns which were strikingly similar to those fielded by Finnish forces. As a result, military spokesman, Captain Karhuvaara stated that 'If Russian Minstry of the Interior Troops were to invade Finland, we would encounter serious trouble'. More generally, the recognition that Russia's threshold for using military violence was lower than anticipated has led to greater defence cooperation with other western states. It will be instructive to see how this year's drills compare with the Zapad and Ladoga 2009 exercises which were largest ever Russian exercises since the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. The latter were formally separate but may be considered as part of an extended series of exercises which took place in August and September 2009. Zapad 2009 featured a simulated tactical nuclear strike against Poland and thereby heralded the emergence of a military doctrine which legitimises the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons in a regional conflict against a non-nuclear power. This year, Finland may receive more of Russia's attention. According to the Russian Federation, NATO expansion to the Russo-Finnish frontier would by itself constitute a military threat. This point was made most bluntly by General Makarov last year when he compared Finnish behaviour to the situation in the Caucasus before 8 August 2008; that is to say, casus belli. This point is made explicit in article 17 of the 2009 Russian National Security Strategy which reads: 'The defining factor in relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation will remain the unacceptability for Russia of plans to bring the Alliance’s military infrastructure forward to Russia’s borders'.[1] In accordance with Russia's military doctrine, this would necessarily lead to a military response. However, by wielding threats toward Finland, Russia may be encouraging the opposite outcome of that which it desires.



[1] National Security Council, 'Strategiya natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda'

My (belated) response to an unbalanced article critical of NATO in the Arctic

In a series of interviews with Voice of Russia, Anti-NATO activist Agneta Nordberg describes the relatively minor steps being considered by Sweden in the Arctic without any reference to the far more significant measures taken by the Russian Federation which has caused the Sweden response. The result is an extremely unbalanced perspective which requires a rebuttal:

'It is the behavior of the Russian Federation which is escalatory. Russia is currently preparing to field its Arctic Group of Forces near the Norwegian and Swedish borders consisting of at least one combined arms brigade under Northern Fleet command. Russian military expenditure will increase by over 25% this year alone. Its defence spending accounts for more than 3.9% of GDP. The Swedish equivalent is only a humble 1.35%. 'Demonizing Russia'? Russia needs no assistance on that front. After all, it was Gen Makarov who, in July 2012, made the link between the Georgian Conflict and the Arctic by effectively threatening Finland; likening manoevures in Finland to the situation in the Caucasus before 8 August 2008. Russian threats towards its neigbours is the reason why the latter flee to NATO for safety. Stop NATO in the Arctic? On the contrary; NATO is our protection. NATO keeps us safe and warm. It is interesting to note that, because of their disdain for the US and NATO, the Anti-NATO Left and the Kremlin regime are fellow travelers on this is issue. Hatred makes strange bedfellows indeed'.

Friday 15 February 2013

Sweden looks to counter-balance Russian rearmament

Recent revelations by the Swedish Armed Forces Chief, General Sverker Göranson, that his country could only effectively resist an attack by the Russian Federation for a few days have caused considerable consternation. According to assessments, in such a scenario, Sweden would rapidly require the military assistance of the US and NATO. His comments came as a protest against recent cuts to the Swedish military which have been enacted in spite of Russia’s marked increase in arms spending. Echoing the sentiments expressed by General Göranson, Deputy Prime Minister Jan Björklund stated that Sweden ought to consider, among other purchases, the procurement of Patriot missile batteries. Demonstrating that it was not only current and former military officers like Björklund who were of such an option, Foreign Minister Carl Bildt also chimed in with similar comments. He made it clear that Russian rearmament was 'worrying' and, although the likelihood of aggression was low, 'in an up-heated mode, Sweden, and Swedish territory could be affected'. The Russian Federation is indeed rearming. Defence spending in 2013 alone is set to increase by more than 25%. Sweden's defence spending per capita is only half of the Norwegian level and is clearly inadequate to deal with the potential threat posed by the Russian Federation.

These statements came only shortly after provocative comments made by Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu. In a speech to the Russian Academy for Military Sciences, Shoigu was blunt in describing the military threats facing Russia. He stated that its armed forces needed to be ready for 'large-scale conflict'. Particularly striking were his comments that 'the use of power continues to play an important role in the resolution of economic and political contradictions between countries'. Shoigu was perhaps referring to the use of force by his own country. Göranson used the example of the Georgian War to demonstrate that the use of armed violence can still result in territorial changes in Europe. The South Ossetian Conflict convinced the Nordic states that Russia's threshold for violence was lower than previously thought. The link between the Nordic States and the Five Day War in the Caucasus has not only been made by Scandinavian leaders, but is also one put forward by the Russians themselves. In June 2012, Russian General Chief of Staff Nikolai Makarov effectively threatened Finland. He noted its increasing cooperation with NATO and stated that, in light of the military manoeuvres in Eastern Finland at the time, the situation was comparable that which existed before the outbreak of hostilities in Georgia in 2008. There is now a strong and growing desire among many in the political and military establishment in Sweden to join NATO. Russian leaders often balk at the prospect of NATO expansion, but by wielding threats of armed force, they seem to do everything in their power to bring it about.